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Abstract We present novel homomorphic encryption schemes for integer arith-
metic, intended primarily for use in secure single-party computation in the cloud.
These schemes are capable of securely computing arbitrary degree polynomials
homomorphically. In practice, ciphertext size and running times limit the polyno-
mial degree, but this appears sufficient for most practical applications. We present
four schemes, with increasing levels of security, but increasing computational
overhead. Two of the schemes provide strong security for high-entropy data. The
remaining two schemes provide strong security regardless of this assumption.
These four algorithms form the first two levels of a hierarchy of schemes which
require linearly decreasing entropy. We have evaluated these four algorithms by
computing low-degree polynomials. The timings of these computations are ex-
tremely favourable by comparison with even the best of existing methods, and
dramatically out-perform running times of directly comparable schemes by a
factor of up to 1000, and considerably more than that for fully homomorphic
schemes, used in the same context. The results clearly demonstrate the practical
applicability of our schemes.
Keywords: Cryptography, symmetric encryption, homomorphic encryption,
computing on encrypted data, secure computation in the cloud.
1 Introduction
With services like Amazon’s Elastic MapReduce and Microsoft’s HDInsight of-
fering large-scale distributed cloud computing environments, computation in the
cloud is becoming increasingly more available. Such services allow for compu-
tation on large volumes of data to be performed without the large investment in
local computing resources. However, where the data that is processed is sensit-
ive, such as financial or medical data, then uploading such data in its raw form
to such a third-party service becomes problematic.
To take advantage of these cloud services, we require a means to process
the data securely on such a platform. We designate such a computation, secure
computation in the cloud (SCC). SCC should not expose input or output data to
any other party, including the cloud service provider. Furthermore, the details
of the computation should not allow any other party to deduce its inputs and
outputs. Cryptography seems the natural approach to this problem.
However, it should be noted that van Dijk and Juels [23] show that crypto-
graphy alone cannot realise secure multi-party computation in the cloud. Since
our approach is via homomorphic encryption, we will restrict our attention to
what we will call secure single-party computation in the cloud (SSCC).
Homomorphic encryption (HE) seems to offer a solution to the SSCC prob-
lem. First defined by Rivest et al. [50] in 1978, HE allows a function to be
computed on encrypted inputs without ever decrypting the inputs. A somewhat
HE scheme (SWHE) is a scheme which is homomorphic for only limited inputs
and functions. Fully HE (FHE) is a scheme that is homomorphic for all func-
tions and inputs. This was first realised by Gentry in 2009 [30], and appeared to
be the ideal HE scheme.
However, despite the clear advantages of FHE, and many significant ad-
vances [12, 13], it remains largely impractical. Two implementations of FHE
schemes, HELib [34] and FHEW [24], both perform very poorly in practice,
both in their running time and space requirements (see section 2.6). Therefore,
we take the view in this paper that only SWHE is, for the forseeable future, of
practical interest. Our goal is to develop new SWHE schemes which are prac-
tically useful, and which we have tested with a realistic implementation.
In this paper, we present four novel SWHE schemes for encryption of in-
tegers that are additively and multiplicatively homomorphic. These schemes are
capable of computing arbitrary degree polynomials. In section 2, we present our
usage scenario, a summary of our results, and a discussion of related work. We
present our initial homomorphic scheme in section 3, in two variants, HE1 and
HE1N. HE1 (section 3.1) provides strong security for integers distributed with
sufficient entropy. This security derives from the assumed hardness of the partial
approximate common divisor problem (PACDP). HE1N (section 3.2) guarantees
strong security for integers not distributed with sufficient entropy or where the
distribution is not known, by adding an additional “noise” term. In addition to
the hardness assumption, we prove that HE1N is IND-CPA secure [5]. Section
4 describes a further two variants, HE2 and HE2N, which increase the entropy
of the plaintext by adding a dimension to the ciphertexts, which are 2-vectors.
This further increases the security of these schemes by effectively doubling the
entropy. HE2 (section 4.1) deals with integers of sufficient entropy, HE2N (sec-
tion 4.2) with integers without the required entropy or of unknown distribution.
HE2N also satisfies IND-CPA. We describe this in some detail, since it appears
to be practically useful, and is the simplest version of our general scheme. We
have performed extensive experimental evaluation of the four schemes presen-
ted in this paper. We report on this in section 5. Our results are extremely fa-
vourable when compared with other methods. In some cases, our algorithms
outperform the running times of directly comparable schemes by a factor of up
to 1000, and considerably more than that for fully homomorphic schemes, used
in the same context. Finally, in section 6, we conclude the paper.
This paper also contains three appendices. In appendix A, we generalise
HE2 and HE2N from 2-vectors to k-vectors, for arbitrary k, in the scheme HEk,
with noisy variant HEkN. These schemes may also be practical for small enough
k. In appendix B, we provide proofs of all theorems and lemmas in this paper.
Finally, in appendix C, we provide the derivation of the bounds on the security
parameters discussed in section 3.1.
2 Background
2.1 Scenario
As introduced above, our work concerns secure single-party computation in the
cloud. In our scenario, a secure client wishes to compute a function on a large
volume of data. This function could be searching or sorting the data, computing
an arithmetic function of numeric data, or any other operation. We consider here
the case where the client wishes to perform arithmetic computations on numeric
data. This data might be the numeric fields within a record, with non-numeric
fields being treated differently.
The client delegates the computation to the cloud. However, while the data
is in the cloud, it could be subject to snooping, including by the cloud provider.
The client does not wish to expose the input data, or the output of the compu-
tation, to possible snooping in the cloud. A snooper here will be a party who
may observe the data and the computation in the cloud, but cannot, or does
not, change the data or insert spurious data. (In our setting data modification
would amount to pointless vandalism.) The snooping may be casual, displaying
an uninvited interest, or malicious, intending to use data for the attacker’s own
purposes.
To obtain the required data privacy, the client’s function will be computed
homomorphically on an encryption of the data. The client encrypts the source
data using a secret key and uploads the encryption to the cloud, with a homo-
morphic equivalent of the target computation. The cloud environment performs
the homomorphic computation on the encrypted data. The result of the homo-
morphic computation is returned to the client, who decrypts it using the secret
key, and obtains the output of the computation.
In this scenario, the source data is never exposed in the cloud, but encryp-
tions of it are. A snooper may observe the computation of the equivalent ho-
momorphic function in the cloud environment. As a result, they may be able to
deduce what operations are performed, even though they do not know the inputs.
A snooper may also be able to inspect the (encrypted) working data generated by
the cloud computation, and even perform side computations of their own. How-
ever, snoopers have no access to the secret key, so cannot make encryptions of
their own.
2.2 Definitions and Notation
x
$←− S denotes a value x chosen uniformly at random from the discrete set S.
KeyGen : S → K denotes the key generation function operating on the
security parameter space S and whose range is the secret key space K.
Enc :M×K → C denotes the symmetric encryption function operating on
the plaintext spaceM and the secret key space K, whose range is the ciphertext
space C.
Dec : C×K →M denotes the symmetric decryption function operating on
the ciphertext space C and the secret key space K, whose range is the plaintext
spaceM.
Add : C×C → C denotes the homomorphic addition function whose domain
is C2 and whose range is C.
Mult : C × C → C denotes the homomorphic multiplication function whose
domain is C2 and whose range is C.
m,m1,m2, . . . denote plaintext values, and c, c1, c2, . . . denote ciphertext
values.
If k∗ =
(
k+1
2
)
, v⋆ = [v1 v2 . . . vk∗ ]
T denotes a k∗-vector which augments
the k-vector v = [v1 v2 . . . vk]
T by appending elements vi = fi(v1, . . . , vk)
(i ∈ [k + 1, k∗]), for a linear function fi. (All vectors are column vectors
throughout.)
ei denotes the ith unit vector (i = 1, 2, . . .), with size determined by the
context.
[x, y] denotes the integers between x and y inclusive, and [x, y) denotes
[x, y] \ {y}.
log denotes loge and lg denotes log2.
If λ is a security parameter, “with high probability” will mean with probab-
ility 1− 2−ǫλ, for some constant ǫ > 0.
Polynomial time or space will mean polynomial in the security parameter λ.
2.3 Formal Model of Scenario
We have n integer inputs m1,m2, . . . ,mn distributed in [0,M) according to a
probability distributionD. IfX is a random integer sampled fromD, letPr[X =
i] = ξi, for i ∈ [0,M). We will consider three measures of the entropy of X ,
measured in bits:
Shannon: H1(X) = −
∑M−1
i=0 ξi lg ξi, Collision: H2(X) = − lg
(∑M−1
i=0 ξ
2
i
)
,
Min: H∞(X) = − lg
(
maxM−1i=0 ξi
)
.
It is known that H1(X) ≥ H2(X) ≥ H∞(X), with equality if and only if X
has the uniform distribution on [0,M), in which case all three are lgM . We will
denote H∞(X) by ρ, so it also follows that H1(X), H2(X) ≥ ρ. We use the
term “entropy” without qualification to mean min entropy, H∞(X). Note that
H∞(X) = ρ ≥ lgM implies ξi ≤ 2−ρ, i ∈ [0,M), and thatM ≥ 2ρ.
We wish to compute a multivariate polynomial P of degree d on these
inputs. A secure client A selects an instance EK of the encryption algorithm
E using the secret parameter set K. A encrypts the n inputs by computing
ci = EK(mi), for i ∈ [1, n]. A uploads c1, c2, . . . , cn and P ′ to the cloud
computing environment, where P ′ is the homomorphic equivalent of P in the
ciphertext space. The cloud environment computes P ′(c1, c2, . . . , cn). A re-
trieves P ′(c1, c2, . . . , cn) from the cloud, and computes
P (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) = EK−1(P ′(c1, c2, . . . , cn)).
A snooper is only able to inspect c1, c2, . . . , cn, the function P
′, and the
computation ofP ′(c1, c2, . . . , cn), including subcomputations and working data,
and perform side-computations on these.4 Thus the snooper is passive or honest-
but-curious [31].
2.4 Observations from Scenario
Our encryption schemes are essentially symmetric key encryption, though there
is no key escrow or distribution problem. The public parameters of our schemes
are exposed to the cloud, but they do not provide an encryption oracle.
Note that the n inputs do not necessarily need to be uploaded at once, but n
is an upper bound on the total number of inputs. For example, if the polynomial
is separable we might compute it in separate stages, and this might be useful in
more dynamic situations.
This model is clearly susceptible to certain attacks. We consider ciphertext
only, brute force, and cryptanalytic attacks. To avoid cryptanalytic attacks, we
must choose the parameters of the system carefully. Here, a brute force attack
will mean guessing the plaintext associated with a ciphertext. In our encryp-
tion schemes, it will be true that a guess can be verified. Since ξi ≤ 2−ρ for
i ∈ [0,M), the expected number µ of guesses before making a correct guess
satisfies µ ≥ 2ρ. Massey [43] gave a corresponding result in terms of the Shan-
non entropy H1(X).
Similarly, probability of any correct guess in 2ρ/2 guesses is at most 2−ρ/2.
This bound holds if we need only guess one of n inputs,m1,m2, . . . ,mn, even
4 However, note that our “N” schemes below provide security even against more malicious
snooping.
if these inputs are not independent. Therefore, if ρ is large enough, a brute force
attack is infeasible. An example of high entropy data is salaries for a large na-
tional or multinational business. Low entropy data might include enumerated
types, such as gender.
In our model, known plaintext attack (KPA) is possible only by brute force,
and not through being given a sample of plaintext, ciphertext pairs. Chosen
plaintext attack (CPA) or chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) do not appear rel-
evant to our model. Since EK is never exposed in the cloud, there is no realistic
analogue of an encryption or decryption oracle, as required by these attacks. In
public key encryption, an encryption algorithm is available as part of the sys-
tem, so CPA should be forestalled, though failure to satisfy IND-CPA [6] does
not imply that we can break the system.
Following [5], it is common in studying symmetric key encryption to sup-
pose that, in most practical settings, defence against CPA or CCA is necessary.
While IND-CPA and IND-CCA are clearly desirable properties for a cryptosys-
tem, their necessity, in the symmetric-key context, seems hard to justify. Both [4]
and [9] provide examples intended to support this convention. However, these
examples are unconvincing. Nevertheless, we show that the “N” variants of our
HE schemes below do satisfy IND-CPA.
We note that observation of the function P ′, which closely resembles P ,
might leak some information about its inputs. However, we assume that this
information is far too weak to threaten the security of the system, as is common
in the HE literature. However, if the threat is significant, “garbled circuits” [31]
are a possible solution.
Finally, we note that our model of SSCC is very similar to the model of
private single-client computing, described in [23]. Furthermore, they describe
an example practical application, a privacy preserving tax return preparation
program, which computes the relevant statistics on government servers without
revealing the client’s inputs. Another example, cited in [42], is a device which
collects health data which is streamed to the cloud. Statistics are computed on
the data and reported back to the device. To protect the patient’s privacy this
data is encrypted by the device and the computations are performed homo-
morphically. Erkin et al. [27] employ a similar scenario in the description of
their privacy-preserving face recognition algorithm.
2.5 Our Results
We describe new practical HE schemes for the encryption of integers, to be em-
ployed in a SSCC system inspired by the HE scheme CryptDB [46]. CryptDB
encrypts integers using the Paillier cryptosystem [45] which is additively homo-
morphic5. Similar systems ([52, 53]) use ElGamal [26] to support multiplica-
tions. The “unpadded” versions of these schemes must be used. These are not
secure under CPA [32], reducing the advantage of a public-key system. These
schemes do not support both addition and multiplication. Computing the in-
ner product function requires re-encrypting the data once the multiplications
have been done, so that the additions can be performed. In a SSCC system, this
requires shipping the data back to the initiator for re-encryption, a significant
communication overhead. We aim to support both addition and multiplication
without this overhead. It should also be noted that a hybrid scheme of Paillier
and ElGamal, for a given modulus, will be limited in the degree of polynomials
that can be computed. Should a product or sum exceed the modulus then the
result cannot be successfully decrypted.
Our scheme is inspired by the SWHE scheme of van Dijk et al. that is used
as the basis for a public-key system. As in their system, we add multiples of
integers to the plaintext to produce a ciphertext. However, [22] supports only
arithmetic mod 2. We generalise their scheme to larger moduli.
We showed above that the input data must have sufficient entropy to negate
brute force attacks. If the data lacks sufficient entropy, we will introduce more in
two ways. The first adds random “noise” of sufficient entropy to the ciphertext,
to “mask” the plaintext. This approach is employed in [22]. In our “N” variants
below, we add a random multiple (from 0 to κ) of a large integer, κ, to the
ciphertext, such thatmi < κ, for all i ∈ [1, N ]. If the entropy of the original data
was ρ, it becomes ρ+lg κ. Therefore, if κ is large enough, our data has sufficient
entropy. But there is a downside. If the noise term grows too large, the ciphertext
cannot be decrypted successfully. So we are restricted to computing polynomials
of bounded degree, but this does not appear to be a practical problem.
The other technique will be to increase the dimension of the ciphertext. We
represent the ciphertext as a k-vector, where each element is a linear function of
the plaintext. Addition and multiplication of ciphertexts use linear algebra. The
basic case k = 1 is described in section 3.1. Then we can increase the entropy by
creating a k-vector ciphertext. Then we must guess k plaintexts to break the sys-
tem. Assuming that the inputs m1,m2, . . . ,mn are chosen independently from
D, and the entropy is ρ, the entropy of a k-tuple (m1,m2, . . . ,mk) is kρ. Thus
the k-vectors effectively have entropy kρ. If k is chosen large enough, we have
sufficient entropy to prevent brute force attack. The assumption of independ-
ence amongm1,m2, . . . ,mn can be relaxed, to allow some correlation, but we
will not discuss the details. On the upside, some cryptanalytic attacks for k = 1
do not seem to generalise even to k = 2. The downside is that ciphertexts are
5 Paillier supports computation of linear functions with known coefficients homomorphically
by repeated addition
k times larger, and each homomorphic multiplication requires Ω(k3) time and
space. For very large k, this probably renders the methods impractical. There-
fore, we consider the case k = 2 in section 4. The general case is considered in
appendix A.
Our work here supports computing arbitrary degree multivariate polynomi-
als on integer data. However, we expect that for many practical applications,
computing low-degree polynomials will suffice. See [42] for a discussion re-
garding this. In this paper, we present four variants of our scheme. Two provide
strong security under the assumption that the input data has high entropy. The
other two provide strong security regardless of this assumption. Appendix A
generalises these four schemes to dimension k ciphertexts.
2.6 Related Work
A comprehensive survey of somewhat and fully HE schemes is presented in [1].
In this section, we discuss those most related to our own work. Some related
work ([46, 52, 53]) has already been discussed in section 2.5.
Our scheme is inspired by that of van Dijk et al. [22]. In their paper they
produce an FHE scheme over the integers, where a simple SWHE scheme for
modulo 2 arithmetic is “bootstrapped” to FHE. Our scheme HE1N below (sec-
tion 3.2) may be regarded as a generalisation of theirs to arbitrary prime moduli.
In van Dijk et al. [22], their symmetric scheme is transformed into a public key
scheme. Though we could do this, we will not do so, since public key systems
appear to have little application to our model. In [19], Coron et al. develop a
similar encryption scheme, where the sum term in the ciphertext is quadratic
rather than linear.
Several implementations of SWHE and FHE schemes have been produced.
Lauter et al. [42] implement the SWHE scheme from [12]. However, they give
results only for degree two polynomials. Our schemes are capable of comput-
ing degree three and four polynomials for practical key and ciphertext sizes.
HELib [34] is an implementation of the BGV [13] FHE scheme. HELib-MP
[48] is an adaptation of HELib to support multi-precision moduli. At the cur-
rent time, it only supports basic SWHE features. The Homomorphic Encryption
Applications and Technology (HEAT) project’s Homomorphic Encryption Ap-
plication Programming Interface (HE-API) [56] has currently integrated HELib
and FV-NFLib [20], an implementation of the Fan and Vercauteren (FV) [28]
SWHE scheme, under a single API. The authors appear to have made signific-
ant improvements in circuit evaluation times, but few details have been made
available [10]. Microsoft’s SEAL library [41] also implements the FV scheme,
albeit, in a modified form. FHEW [25] implements the FHE scheme described
in [24]. The performance of these implementations is discussed in section 5.
Erkin et al. [27] exploit the linearly-homomorphic properties of Paillier
to compute feature vector matches in their privacy-preserving face recognition
algorithm. Our schemes can likewise compute known linear functions, simply
by not encrypting the coefficients of the function.
Catalano et al. [15] aim to extend a linearly-homomorphic system, such as
Paillier [45], to compute multivariate quadratics homomorphically. However,
their extension relies on pre-computing a product for each pair of plaintexts and
then applying a linear function on the encryption of these products. As such, it
does not extend the underlying linear encryption scheme and is not multiplic-
atively homomorphic. They claim that their system can compute any degree 2
polynomial with at most one multiplication. However, it is not clear how they
would compute the polynomialm1 · (m2+ . . .+mn) without performing n−1
offline multiplications. By contrast, our scheme would only require one multi-
plication. In [14], Catalano et al. extend their approach to cubics.
Zhou and Wornell [59] construct a scheme based on integer vectors, sim-
ilar, in some respects, to our HE2 (section 4.1) and HEk (appendix A) schemes.
Bogos et al. [8] demonstrate that the system displays some theoretical insecur-
ities. However, the question of whether these are of practical importance is not
addressed.
The symmetric MORE scheme [39] uses linear transformations, as do our
schemes but in a different way. MORE has been shown [57] to be insecure
against KPA, at least as originally proposed. However, whether KPA is relevant
in applications of the scheme is unclear.
Recent work on functional encryption [33] should also be noted.While these
results are of great theoretical interest, the scenario where such schemes might
be applied is rather different from our model. Also, the methods of [33] seem too
computationally expensive to be of practical interest in the immediate future.
3 Initial Homomorphic Scheme
3.1 Sufficient Entropy (HE1)
We have integer inputs m1,m2, . . . ,mn ∈ [0,M). (Negative integers can be
handled as in van Dijk et al. [22], by taking residues in [−(p−1)/2, (p−1)/2),
rather than [0, p).) We wish to compute a polynomial P of degree d in these
inputs. The inputs are distributed with entropy ρ, where ρ is large enough, as
discussed in section 2.3 above. In practical terms, ρ ≥ 32 will provide sufficient
entropy for strong security, since breaking the system would require more than a
billion guessses. Our HE scheme is the system (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Add,Mult).
Key Generation. Let λ be a security parameter, measured in bits. Let p
and q be randomly chosen large distinct primes such that p ∈ [2λ−1, 2λ], and
q ∈ [2η−1, 2η], where η ≈ λ2/ρ − λ. Here λ must be large enough to negate
direct factorisation of pq (see [40]), and p and q are chosen to negate Cop-
persmith’s attack [18]. We will also require p > (n + 1)dMd to ensure that
P (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) < p, so that the result of the computation can be success-
fully decrypted. Our bounds are worst case, allowing for polynomials which
contain all possible monomial terms. For some applications, they will be much
larger than required to ensure that P (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) < p and smaller bounds
will suffice. Our function KeyGen will randomly select p and q according to
these bounds. Then p is the private symmetric key for the system and pq is the
modulus for arithmetic performed by Add and Mult. pq is a public parameter of
the system. We assume that the entropy ρ ≫ lg λ, so that a brute force attack
cannot be carried out in polynomial time.
Security Parameters. We can easily set the security parameters λ and η to
practical values. If n ≈ √M , M ≈ 2ρ then we may take λ ≈ 3dρ/2 and
η ≈ 3dλ/2 − λ (see appendix C). For, example, if ρ = 32, d = 4, we can take
any λ > 192, η > 960.
Encryption. We encrypt a plaintext integerm as
Enc(m, p) = m+ rp (mod pq), where r
$←− [1, q).
Decryption. We decrypt the ciphertext c by Dec(c, p) = c (mod p).
Addition. The sum modulo pq of two ciphertexts, c = m + rp and c′ =
m′ + r′p, is
Add(c, c′) = c+ c′ = m+m′ + (r + r′)p (mod pq) .
This decrypts tom+m′, providedm+m′ < p.
Multiplication The product modulo pq of two ciphertexts, c = m+ rp and
c′ = m′ + r′p, is
Mult(c, c′) = cc′ = mm′ + (rm′ + r′m+ rr′p)p (mod pq),
which decrypts tomm′, providedmm′ < p.
Security. Security of the system is provided by the partial approximate com-
mon divisor problem (PACDP), first posed by Howgrave-Graham [36], but can
be formulated [16, 17] as:
Definition 1. (Partial approximate common divisor problem.) Suppose we are
given one input x0, of the form pr0, and n inputs xi, of the form pri +mi, i ∈
[1, n], where p is an unknown constant integer and the mi and ri are unknown
integers. We have a boundB such that |mi| < B for all i. Under what conditions
on themi and ri, and the boundB, can an algorithm be found that can uniquely
determine p in time polynomial in the total bit length of the numbers involved?
A straightforward attack on this problem is by brute force. Consider x1.
Assuming that m1 is sampled from D, having entropy ρ, we successively try
values form1 and compute gcd(x0, x1 −m1) in polynomial time until we find
a divisor that is large enough to recover p. Then we can recovermi as (xi mod
p) for i ∈ [2, n]. As discussed in section 2.3, the search will requires 2ρ gcd
operations in expectation. Note that publicly known constants, need not, and
should not be encrypted. Encrypting them provides an obvious guessing attack.
Several attempts have been made to solve the PACDP [16, 17, 36], resulting
in theoretically faster algorithms for some cases of the problem. The paper [16]
gives an algorithm requiring only
√
M polynomial time operations if D is the
uniform distribution on [0,M), and hence ρ = lgM . No algorithm running in
time subexponential in ρ is known for this problem, so the encryption will be
secure if ρ is large enough. See [29] for a survey and evaluation of attacks on
PACDP.
Our system is a special case of PACDP, since we use the residues mod-
ulo a distinct semiprime. A semiprime is a natural number that is the product
of two primes. A distinct semiprime is a semiprime where the primes are dis-
tinct. We call this the semiprime partial approximate common divisor problem
(SPACDP). It is a restriction, but there is no reason to believe that it is any easier
than PACDP.
Definition 2. (Semiprime factorisation problem.) Given a semiprime s, the product
of primes p and q, can p and q be determined in polynomial time?
The computational complexity of this problem, which lies at the heart of the
widely-used RSA cryptosystem, is open, other than for quantum computing,
which currently remains impractical. We will show that breaking HE1 is equi-
valent to semiprime factorisation. Therefore, our scheme is at least as secure as
unpadded RSA [49].
Theorem 1. An attack against HE1 is successful in polynomial time if and only
if we can factorise a distinct semi-prime in polynomial time.
With low entropy plaintexts, there is a brute force attack on this system,
which we call a collision attack. Suppose we have a pair of equal plaintexts
m1 = m2. The difference between their encryptions (c1 − c2) is an encryption
of 0, and KPA is possible. In fact, for n plaintexts m1,m2, . . . ,mn, if there
exist i, j ∈ [1, n] withmi = mj , then
∏
1≤i<j≤n(cj − ci) is an encryption of 0.
However, if there is sufficient entropy, this attack is not possible.
Lemma 1. If the inputsm have entropy ρ then, for any two independent inputs
m1,m2, Pr(m1 = m2) ≤ 2−ρ.
Thus, for n inputs, m1,m2, . . . ,mn the probability that there exist i, j ∈
[1, n] withmi = mj is at most
(
n
2
)
2−ρ. If n < 2−ρ/3, this probability is at most
2−ρ/3. Hence, for large enough λ, collision attack is infeasible.
3.2 Insufficient Entropy (HE1N)
Suppose now that the integer inputs mi, i ∈ [1, n], are distributed with entropy
ρ, where ρ is not large enough to negate a brute force guessing attack. There-
fore, we increase the entropy of the plaintext by adding an additional “noise”
term to the ciphertext. This will be a multiple s (from 0 to κ) of an integer κ,
chosen so that the entropy ρ′ = ρ+ lg κ is large enough to negate a brute force
guessing attack. As a result of the extra linear term in the ciphertext, we com-
pute P (m1, . . . ,mn, κ) instead. We can easily retrieve P (m1, . . . ,mn) from
P (m1, . . . ,mn, κ).
Key Generation. KeyGen now randomly chooses p and q as in HE1, but
with η = λ2/ρ′ − λ, and p > (n + 1)d(M + κ2)d so that P (m1 + s1κ,m2 +
s2κ, . . . ,mN+snκ) < p, when s1, s2, . . . , sn ∈ [0, κ). KeyGen also randomly
chooses κ, where κ > (n+1)dMd, so that P (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) < κ. The secret
key, sk, is now (κ, p).
Security Parameters. Again, we can set the security parameters λ and η to
practical values. If we assume M ≈ 2ρ and large enough n, as in section 3.1,
then we may take lg κ > d(lg n+ ρ), ρ′ = ρ+ lg κ, λ > d(lg n+2 lg κ). Then,
for example, if d = 3, lg n = 16, ρ = 8, then lg κ > 72, ρ′ = 80, λ > 480,
η > 2400. In the extreme case that the inputs are bits, so ρ = 1, and d = 3,
lg n = 16, then we can take lg κ ≈ 51 and ρ′ ≈ 52, and we have λ > 354,
η > 2056, which is only 15% smaller than for ρ = 8.
Encryption. We encrypt plaintext m as Enc(m, sk) = m + sκ + rp
(mod pq), where r
$←− [1, q) and s $←− [0, κ).
Decryption. We decrypt ciphertext c as Dec(c, sk) = (c mod p) mod κ.
Arithmetic. Addition and multiplication of ciphertexts is as above.
Security. The use of random noise gives the encryption the following “indis-
tinguishability” property, which implies that the system satisfies IND-CPA [5,
6].
Theorem 2. For any encryption c, c mod κ is polynomial time indistinguish-
able from the uniform distribution on [0, κ). Thus HE1N satisfies IND-CPA,
under the assumption that SPACDP is not polynomial time solvable.
Therefore, HE1N is resistant to both the “guessing” and “collision” attacks
discussed in section 3.1.
Hybrid scheme. Note that mixed data, some of which has high entropy and
some low, can be encrypted with a hybrid of HE1 and HE1N. More generally,
we can choose s to be smaller for higher entropy and larger for lower entropy,
say s ∈ [0, χi), where 0 ≤ χi < κ, for the ith data type, rather than [0, κ). How-
ever, κ itself remains the same for all i, or we cannot decrypt. Then the entropy
increases to ρi + lgχi for data type i. The advantage is a smaller blow-up in
the noise. A possible disadvantage is that this mixed scheme may not necessar-
ily have the IND-CPA property of Theorem 2. The same idea can be applied to
HE2 and HE2N below, and to the HEkN schemes, for k > 2, described in the
appendix.
4 Adding a Dimension
In this section we discuss adding an additional dimension to the ciphertext,
which becomes a 2-vector. The purpose of this is to increase the level of security
beyond HE1 and HE1N. In both schemes presented below, HE2 and HE2N, we
add a further vector term, with two further secret parameters. The two schemes
presented below have a constant factor overhead for arithmetic operations. An
addition operation in the plaintext space requires two additions in the ciphertext
space, and a multiplication in the plaintext space requires nine multiplications
and four additions in the ciphertext space.
4.1 Sufficient Entropy (HE2)
As with HE1, it is assumed that the inputs mi (i ∈ [1, n]) are of sufficient
entropy.
Key Generation. p and q are randomly chosen by KeyGen according to the
bounds given in section 3.1. KeyGen sets a = [a1 a2]
T , where ai
$←− [1, pq)
(i ∈ [1, 2]) such that a1, a2, a1 − a2 6= 0 (mod p and mod q).6 KeyGen also
sets R, the re-encryption matrix (see “Multiplication”) as[
1− 2α1 α1 α1
−2α2 α2 + 1 α2
]
,
where
α1 = β
−1(σa1 + ̺p− a21), α2 = β−1(σa2 + ̺p− a22), (1)
such that β = 2(a2 − a1)2, ̺ $←− [0, q] and σ $←− [0, pq).
The secret key sk is (p,a) and the public parameters are pq and R.
6 The condition a1, a2, a1 − a2 6= 0, (mod p, mod q) fails with exponentially small probab-
ility 3(1/p+ 1/q). Thus, a1 and a2 are indistinguishable in polynomial time from a1, a2
$
←−
[0, pq).
Encryption. We encrypt a plaintext integerm as the 2-vector c,
c = Enc(m, sk) = (m+ rp)1+ sa (mod pq),
where 1 = [1 1]T , r
$←− [0, q), and s $←− [0, pq). r and s are independent.
We note that two encryptions of the same plaintext are different with very high
probability.
Theorem 3. The encryption scheme produces ciphertexts with components which
are random integers modulo pq.
Note, however, that the components of the ciphertexts are correlated, and
this may be a vulnerability. We discuss this later in this section (“Cryptana-
lysis”).
Decryption. To decrypt, we eliminate s from c (modulo p), giving
Dec(c, sk) = γTc mod p,
where γT = (a2 − a1)−1[a2 − a1]. We call γ the decryption vector.
Addition. We define the addition operation on ciphertexts as the vector sum
modulo pq of the two ciphertext vectors c and c′,
Add(c, c′) = c+ c′ (mod pq).
Therefore, if inputsm,m′ encrypt as (m+ rp)1+ sa, (m′+ r′p+)1+ s′a,
Add(c, c′) = c+ c′ = (m+m′ + (r + r′)p)1+ (s+ s′)a.
which is a valid encryption ofm+m′.
Multiplication. If c = [c1 c2]
T , we construct the augmented ciphertext vec-
tor, c⋆ = [c1 c2 c3]
T , where c3 = 2c1−c2. Thus, c3 = (m+rp)+sa3 mod pq,
for a3 = 2a1 − a2. So,
Mult(c, c′) = c · c′ = R(c⋆ ◦ c′⋆) (mod pq),
where · is a product on Z2pq and c⋆ ◦ c′⋆ is the Hadamard product modulo pq of
the two augmented ciphertext vectors c⋆ and c
′
⋆
.
Theorem 4. If c is an encryption ofm and c′ is an encryption ofm′ thenR(c⋆◦
c′
⋆
) (mod pq) is an encryption ofmm′.
Observe that α1, α2 inR are public, but give only two equations for the four
parameters of the system a1, a2, σ, ̺p. These equations are quadratic mod pq,
and solving them is as hard as semiprime factorisation in the worst case [47].
Also, observe that, independently of a,
Rc⋆ = (m+ rp)R1⋆ + sRa⋆ = (m+ rp)1+ sa = c,
for any ciphertext c. Hence re-encrypting a ciphertext gives the identity opera-
tion, and discloses no information.
Hardness. We can show that this system is at least as hard as SPACDP. In
fact,
Theorem 5. SPACDP is of equivalent complexity to the special case of HE2
where δ = a2 − a1 (0 < δ < q) is known.
Without knowing the parameter δ = a2 − a1, HE2 cannot be reduced to
SPACDP in this way, so HE2 is more secure than HE1.
Cryptanalysis. Each new ciphertext c introduces two new unknowns r, s
and two equations for c1, c2. Thus we gain no additional information from a
new ciphertext. However, if we can guess, m, m′ for any two ciphertexts c, c′,
we can determine
(c1 −m) = rp+ sa1, (c2 −m) = rp+ sa2,
(c′1 −m′) = r′p+ s′a1, (c′2 −m′) = r′p+ s′a2,
so (c1 −m)(c′2 −m′)− (c2 −m)(c′1 −m′) = (a2 − a1)(rs′ − r′s)p (mod pq)
Since a2 6= a1, and sr′ 6= s′r with high probability, this is a nonzero multiple
of p, νp say. We may assume ν < q, so p = gcd(νp, pq). We can now solve the
linear system γT [c c′] = [m m′] mod p to recover the decryption vector. This
effectively breaks the system, since we can now decrypt an arbitrary ciphertext.
We could proceed further, and attempt to infer a1 and a2, but we will not do so.
Note that to break this system, we need to guess two plaintexts, as opposed
to one in HE1. The entropy of a pair (m,m′) is 2ρ, so we have effectively
squared the number of guesses needed to break the system relative to HE1. So
HE2 can tolerate smaller entropy than HE1. We note further that HE2 does not
seem immediately vulnerable to known cryptanalytic attacks on HE1 [16, 17,
36].
4.2 Insufficient Entropy (HE2N)
In this section we extend HE1N above (section 3.2) to two dimensions.
Key Generation. KeyGen randomly chooses p, q and κ according to the
bounds given in section 3.2. 1 is defined as in section 4.1. a, andR are generated
as in section 4.1. The secret key is (κ, p,a), and the public parameters are pq
and R, defined in section 4.1.
Encryption. We encrypt a plaintext integerm ∈ [0,M) as a 2-vector c,
Enc(m, sk) = c = (m+ rp+ sκ)1+ ta mod pq,
where r is as in section 4.1, s
$←− [0, κ), and t $←− [0, pq).
Decryption. We decrypt a ciphertext c by Dec(c, sk) = (γTc mod p)
mod κ, where γT is defined as in 4.1.
Arithmetic. Addition and multiplication of ciphertexts are as in section 4.1.
Security. HE2N has all the properties of HE1N. However, it is more secure,
since there is an additional unknown parameter in the ciphertext. We also note
that HE2N satisfies Theorem 2, so it inherits the IND-CPA property.
4.3 Generalisation of HE2 and HE2N to k Dimensions
The integer vector based approach of HE2 and HE2N can be generalised to
vectors of dimension k. We do not have space to present this material here, but
it may be found in appendix A.
5 Experimental Results
HE1, HE1N, HE2, and HE2N have been implemented in pure unoptimised
Java using the JScience mathematics library [21]. Secure pseudo-random num-
bers are generated using the ISAAC algorithm [37], seeded using the Linux
/dev/random source. This prevents the weakness in ISAAC shown by Aumas-
son [3].
The evaluation experiment generated 24,000 encrypted inputs and evalu-
ated a polynomial homomorphically on the inputs, using a Hadoop MapReduce
(MR) algorithm. On the secure client side, the MR input is generated as pseudo-
random ρ-bit integers which are encrypted and written to a file with d inputs
per line, where d is the degree of the polynomial to be computed. The security
parameters λ and η were selected to be the minimum values required to satisfy
the conditions give in sections 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, and 4.2. In addition, the unencryp-
ted result of the computation is computed so that it may checked against the
decrypted result of the homomorphic computation. On the Hadoop cluster side,
each mapper processes a line of input by homomorphically multiplying together
each input on a line and outputs this product. A single reducer homomorphically
sums the products. The MR algorithm divides the input file so that each mapper
receives an equal number of lines of input, ensuring maximum parallelisation.
Finally, on the secure client side, the MR output is decrypted.
Our test environment consisted of a single secure client (an Ubuntu Linux
VM with 16GB RAM) and a Hadoop 2.7.3 cluster running in a heterogeneous
OpenNebula cloud. The Hadoop cluster consisted of 17 Linux VMs, one master
and 16 slaves, each allocated 2GB of RAM. Each experimental configuration of
algorithm, polynomial degree (d), integer size (ρ), and effective entropy of in-
puts after adding “noise” (ρ′, for the ‘N’ variant algorithms only), was executed
10 times. The means are tabulated in Table 1.
There are some small anomalies in our data. JScience implements arbitrary
precision integers as an array of Java long (64-bit) integers. This underlying
representation may be optimal in some of our test configurations and suboptimal
Table 1. Timings for each experimental configuration (n = 24000 in all cases, λ > 96). Init is the
initialisation time for the encryption algorithm, Enc is the mean time to encrypt a single integer,
Exec is the total MR job execution time, Prod is the mean time to homomorphically compute the
product of two encrypted integers, Sum is the mean time to homomorphically compute the sum
of two encrypted integers.
Alg. Parameters Encryption MR Job Decrypt
d ρ ρ′ Init(s) Enc(µs) Exec(s) Prod(µs) Sum(µs) (ms)
HE1 2 32 n/a 0.12 13.52 23.82 54.41 9.06 0.21
HE1 2 64 n/a 0.12 16.24 23.85 60.38 8.04 0.49
HE1 2 128 n/a 0.15 25.73 23.77 84.69 8.43 0.28
HE1 3 32 n/a 0.17 22.98 23.65 87.75 11.46 0.35
HE1 3 64 n/a 0.19 34.63 24.72 95.68 12.37 0.45
HE1 3 128 n/a 0.42 54.83 26.05 196.71 14.07 0.55
HE1 4 32 n/a 0.28 43.36 24.48 108.72 13.75 0.5
HE1 4 64 n/a 0.53 58.85 26.41 227.44 15.85 3.59
HE1 4 128 n/a 1.36 104.95 28.33 484.95 16.92 5.67
HE1N 2 1 32 0.22 32.99 22.94 88.38 8.53 3.35
HE1N 2 1 64 0.39 52.63 26.24 168.54 12.39 3.56
HE1N 2 1 128 1.2 89.01 26.18 226.2 13.16 8.1
HE1N 2 8 32 0.6 57.88 25.9 177.36 11.17 7.18
HE1N 2 8 64 0.32 43.93 26.53 96.78 12.18 2.27
HE1N 2 8 128 1.13 78.11 24.42 212.75 11.07 8.4
HE1N 2 16 64 0.33 53.97 27.15 168 13.67 4.47
HE1N 2 16 128 0.63 68.73 25.22 194.42 11.01 7.65
HE1N 3 1 32 8.54 183.19 24.24 522.07 12.06 9.09
HE1N 3 1 64 3.67 125 29.49 467.36 18.22 11.43
HE1N 3 1 128 27.84 313.76 26.94 1235.77 15.04 11.75
HE1N 3 8 32 115 462.45 32.61 1556.17 21.11 19.79
HE1N 3 8 64 9.75 180.08 25.87 500.62 15.03 10.39
HE1N 3 8 128 36.05 259.15 30.1 836.27 20.68 11.45
HE1N 3 16 64 30.96 378.99 28.24 1338.33 15.51 13.3
HE1N 3 16 128 8.13 226.32 27.92 621.95 18.01 10.89
HE2 2 32 n/a 0.16 85.79 26.82 305.52 11.68 4.83
HE2 2 64 n/a 0.17 95.92 29.71 354.79 16.9 3.26
HE2 2 128 n/a 0.22 132.53 32.84 540.78 22.83 4.92
HE2 3 32 n/a 0.23 130.3 31.18 513.93 23.77 6.52
HE2 3 64 n/a 0.29 145.62 32.84 615.9 24.61 6.3
HE2 3 128 n/a 0.52 249.47 29.54 1443.82 16.56 18.34
HE2 4 32 n/a 0.39 175.63 29.5 733.23 20.69 6.01
HE2 4 64 n/a 0.7 255.3 29.55 1578.39 18.29 16.24
HE2 4 128 n/a 2.7 465.51 37.47 2943.91 22.15 15.41
HE2N 2 1 32 0.27 147.83 29.74 571.94 16.58 5.66
HE2N 2 1 64 0.43 202.74 33.36 1291.68 18.3 13.23
HE2N 2 1 128 1.58 354.19 33.76 1977.51 17.13 12.46
HE2N 2 8 32 0.59 234.83 31.42 1413.31 15.21 14.92
HE2N 2 8 64 0.33 163.78 27.42 635.64 13.6 6.18
HE2N 2 8 128 0.9 307.68 36.32 1850.83 21.71 15.79
HE2N 2 16 64 0.42 208.1 29.96 1230.56 13.41 13.16
HE2N 2 16 128 0.73 274.48 30.82 1585.1 14.85 15.04
HE2N 3 1 32 5.72 651.1 36.49 3438.96 18.67 19.05
HE2N 3 1 64 4.45 477.52 35.33 3073.46 18.75 19.77
HE2N 3 1 128 26.83 1192.79 43.23 6416.43 22.48 25.12
HE2N 3 8 32 87.38 1658.36 49.63 8139.19 23.71 27.24
HE2N 3 8 64 5.21 607.75 36.54 3337.1 22.28 17.39
HE2N 3 8 128 17.14 945.64 40.49 4620.69 25.91 22.41
HE2N 3 16 64 39.19 1368.18 44.88 7005.7 24.1 28.3
HE2N 3 16 128 11.39 774.07 36.05 3845.1 20.29 20.74
in others, causing anomalous results. Another possibility is that the unexpected
results are due to garbage collection in the JVM heap, which may be more pre-
valent in certain test configurations.
We may compare these results with those reported in the literature. Our res-
ults compare extremely favourably with Table 2 of [42]. For encryption, our
results are, in the best case, 1000 times faster than those presented there, and,
in the worst case, 10 times faster. For decryption, our results are comparable.
However, it should be noted that to decrypt our results we take the moduli for
large primes rather than 2 as in [42], which is obviously less efficient. For homo-
morphic sums and products, our algorithms perform approximately 100 times
faster. [42] only provides experimental data for computing degree 2 polynomi-
als. We provide experimental results for higher degree polynomials.
Similarly, compared with Fig. 13 of Popa et al. [46], our encryption times
for a 32-bit integer are considerably faster. While a time for computing a homo-
morphic sum on a column is given in Fig. 12, it is unclear how many rows ex-
ist in their test database. Nevertheless, our results for computing homomorphic
sums compare favourably with those given. Since CryptDB [46] only supports
homomorphic sums and cannot compute an inner product, we can only compare
the homomorphic sum timings.
Table 1 of [52] is unclear whether the timings are aggregate or per opera-
tion. Even assuming that they are aggregate, our results are approximately 100
times faster for homomorphic sum and product operations. Crypsis [52] uses
two different encryption schemes for integers, ElGamal [26] and Paillier [45],
which only support addition or multiplication but not both. No discussion of
computation of an inner product is made in [52] but we expect that the timings
would be considerably worse as data encrypted using ElGamal to compute the
products would have to be shipped back to the secure client to be re-encrypted
using Paillier so that the final inner product could be computed.
Varia et al. [55] present experimental results of applying their HETest frame-
work to HELib [35]. Varia et al. show timings 104 to 106 times slower than that
of computations on unencrypted data. Although it is unclear exactly which cir-
cuits are being computed, the timings given are in seconds, so we believe that
HELib will not be a serious candidate for SSCC in the immediate future.
As reported in [24], the current performance of FHEW [25] is poor com-
pared with unencrypted operations. The authors report that FHEW processed a
single homomorphic NAND operation followed by a re-encryption in 0.69s and
using 2.2GB of RAM. Therefore, we also believe that FHEW is not a candidate
for SCCC, as it currently stands.
Although claims regarding its performance have been made in the press
[54], no benchmarking statistics have been made publicly available for Mi-
crosoft’s SEAL library [41]. However, in [2], it is reported that, for SEAL v1,
the time to perform one multiplication is approximately 140ms.
With regard to FV-NFLib [20], Bonte et al. [10] recently reported a signific-
ant decrease in the time to evaluate a four layerGroup Method of Data Handling
(GMDH) neural network [11] from 32s to 2.5s, as a result of their novel encod-
ing of the inputs.
Aguilar-Melchor et al [2] report their experimental findings regarding HELib-
MP [48]. They show that HELib-MP outperforms FV-NFLib for large (2048-bit)
plaintexts. They further go on to benchmark HELib-MP by computing RSA-
2048 and ECC-ElGamal-P256. An exponentiation in RSA-2048 takes between
157ms and 1.8s depending on the window size and number of multiplications re-
quired. For ECC-ElGamal-P256, an elliptic curve multiplication takes between
96ms and 242ms depending on window size and number of elliptic curve addi-
tions.
Catalano et al. [15] provide experimental results for their work. For 128-
bit plaintexts, our algorithms are approximately 10 to 1000 times faster at per-
forming a multiplication operation and our most complex algorithm, HE2N, is
roughly equal to their fastest, an extension of Joye-Libert [38], for additions.
Yu et al. [58] give experimental results for their implementation of the Zhou
and Wornell scheme [59]. From their Figures 3 to 5, it is hard to compare our
scheme with theirs directly but it would appear that our vector based schemes
are at least comparable in performance to theirs.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented several new homomorphic encryption schemes
intended for use in a practical SSCC system. We envisage that the majority of
computation on integer big data, outside of scientific computing, will be com-
puting low degree polynomials on integers, or fixed-point decimals which can
be converted to integers. Our somewhat homomorphic schemes are perfectly
suited to these types of computation.
Our evaluation has only concerned one- or two-dimensional ciphertexts and
polynomials of degree up to four. We intend to investigate higher degree polyno-
mials in future work. We believe that HE1N and HE2N provide strong security,
even for low-entropy data, as they satisfy the desirable IND-CPA property. If a
user has a high confidence in the entropy of the input data, HE2 may provide
sufficient security.
As they are only somewhat homomorphic, each of these schemes require
that the computational result cannot grow bigger than the secret modulus. In the
case of the “noise” variants, we also have to consider the noise term growing
large. So, as they stand, these schemes can only compute polynomials of suit-
ably bounded degree. However, we believe this is adequate for most practical
purposes.
The schemes presented in sections 3 and 4 extend to a hierarchy of systems,
HEk, with increasing levels of security. These are presented in appendix A and
may be investigated further in future work.
We have implemented and evaluated the HE1, HE1N, HE2 and HE2N schemes
as part of an SSCC system as discussed in section 5. Our results are extremely
favourable by comparison with existing methods. In some cases, they outper-
form those methods by a factor of 1000. This clearly demonstrates the practical
applicability of our schemes. Furthermore, our MapReduce job execution times
remain low even when using the largest set of parameters for HE2N. We believe
that this demonstrates the advantages of our schemes for encrypted computa-
tions on fixed-point data in the cloud.
A Generalisation to k Dimensions
In this appendix, we generalise HE2 and HE2N to k-vectors. HE1 and HE1N
are the cases for k = 1 and HE2 and HE2N are the cases for k = 2.
A.1 Sufficient Entropy (HEk)
We generalise HE2 to k dimensions.
KeyGeneration. KeyGen randomly chooses p and q according to the bounds
given in section 4.1. KeyGen sets aj
$←− [1, pq)k, ∀j ∈ [1, k − 1], and R (de-
tailed in “Multiplication” below). The secret key sk is (p,a1, . . . ,ak−1), and
the public parameters are pq and R.
Computational Overhead. The computational overhead increases, the num-
ber of arithmetic operations per plaintext multiplication is O(k3), and the space
requirement per ciphertext is O(k), by comparison with HE1.
Encryption. A plaintext,m ∈ [0,M ], is enciphered as
Enc(m, sk) = c = (m+ rp)1+
∑k−1
j=1 sjaj mod pq
where c is a k-vector, r
$←− [0, q), and ∀j, sj $←− [0, pq). Let a0 = 1, and
Ak = [a0 a1 . . . ak−1]. We wish the columns of Ak to be a basis for Z
k
pq. We
can show that they do so with high probability. If they do not, we generate new
vectors until they do.
Lemma 2. Pr(a0,a1, . . . ,ak−1 do not form a basis) ≤ (k − 1)(1/p+ 1/q).
We extend our definition of an augmented vector v⋆, for a k-vector, v, such
that v⋆ is a
(
k+1
2
)
-vector, with components vi (1 ≤ i ≤ k) followed by 2vi − vj
(1 ≤ i < j ≤ k). In general, for ℓ > k, vℓ = 2vi−vj , where ℓ =
(
i
2
)
+k+j−1.
Note that v⋆ = Ukv for a
(
k+1
2
)×k matrix with entries 0,±1, 2, and whose first
k rows form the k × k identity matrix Ik. Note that v⋆ = Ukv implies that 1⋆
is the
(
k+1
2
)
vector of 1’s, and that ∗ is a linear mapping, i.e. (r1v1 + r2v2)⋆ =
r1v1∗ + r2v2∗.
Decryption. Dec(c, sk) = γT c mod p, where γT = (A−1k )1 is the first
row of A−1k . We call γ the decryption vector, as in HE2.
Addition. Addition is the vector sum of the ciphertext vectors as in HE2.
Multiplication. Consider the Hadamard product of two augmented cipher-
text vectors, c⋆ ◦ c′⋆. For notational brevity, let m˜ = m+ rp.
c⋆ ◦ c′⋆ =
(
m˜1⋆ +
∑k−1
j=1 sja⋆j
) ◦ (m˜′1⋆ +∑k−1j=1 s′ja⋆j)
= m˜m˜′1⋆ +
∑k−1
j=1(m˜s
′
j + m˜
′sj)a⋆j +
∑k−1
j=1 sjs
′
ja⋆j ◦ a⋆j
+
∑
1≤i<j≤k−1(sis
′
j + s
′
isj)a⋆i ◦ a⋆j ,
since 1⋆ ◦ v⋆ = v⋆ for any v. There are
(
k
2
)
product vectors, which we must
eliminate using the re-encryption matrix R, a k × (k+1
2
)
.
Lemma 3. Let A⋆k = [a⋆0 a⋆1 . . . a⋆,k−1], where the columns of Ak form a
basis for Zkpq. If RA⋆k = Ak, then Rv⋆ = v for all v ∈ Zkpq.
The conditionRA⋆k = Ak can be written more simply, since it isRUkAk =
Ak. Postmultiplying byA
−1
k givesRUk = Ik. Now, sinceRA⋆k = Ak, we have
R(c⋆ ◦ c′⋆) = (mm′ + rˆp)1+
∑k−1
j=1 sˆjaj +
∑
1≤i≤j≤k−1 sˆijR(a⋆i ◦ a⋆j),
where rˆ, sˆj and sˆij (1 ≤ i < j ≤ k − 1) are some integers.
There are k(
(
k+1
2
) − k) = k(k
2
)
undetermined parameters Riℓ, 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
k < ℓ ≤ (k+1
2
)
. We now determine these by setting
R(a⋆i ◦ a⋆j) = ̺ijp1+
∑k−1
l=1 σijlal (2)
Thus we have k
(
k
2
)
new unknowns, the ̺’s and σ’s, and k
(
k
2
)
linear equations for
the k
(
k
2
)
unassigned Riℓ’s. Let A
◦2
⋆k be the
(
k+1
2
) × (k+1
2
)
matrix with columns
a⋆i ◦ a⋆j (0 ≤ i < j < k), and let Ck be the k ×
(
k
2
)
matrix with columns
̺ijp1 +
∑k−1
l=1 σijlal (0 < i < j < k). Then the equations for the Riℓ can be
written as
RA◦2⋆k = [Ak | Ck] . (3)
giving k
(
k+1
2
)
linear equations for the k
(
k+1
2
)
Riℓ’s in terms of quadratic func-
tions of the k(k−1) aij’s (1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ k−1), which are undetermined.
Thus the system has k(k − 1) parameters that cannot be deduced from R.
The system of equations (3) has a solution provided that A◦2⋆k has an inverse
mod pq. We prove that this is true with high probability. Again, in the unlikely
event that this is not true, we generate new vectors a1, . . . ,ak−1 until it is.
Theorem 6. A◦2⋆k has no inverse mod pq with probability at most (k
2−1)(1/p+
1/q).
Note that Theorem 6 subsumes Lemma 2, since the first k columns of A◦2⋆k
contain Ak as a submatrix, and must be linearly independent.
Each c introduces k new parameters rp, s1, . . . , sk−1 and k equations, so
the number of undetermined parameters is always k(k − 1).
Cryptanalysis. Note that p can be determined frommi for k ciphertexts. Let
C = [c1 −m11 . . . ck −mk1], Ak = [1 a1 . . . ak−1]
and let
W =


r1p r2p . . . rkp
s1,1 s2,1 . . . sk,1
...
...
s1,k−1 s2,k−1 . . . sk,k−1

 , W ′ =


r1 r2 . . . rk
s1,1 s2,1 . . . sk,1
...
...
s1,k−1 s2,k−1 . . . sk,k−1

 ,
where ri, sij refer to ci. Then C = AkW , and so detC = detAk detW . Note
that detW = p detW ′, so detC is a multiple of p. Now detC can be determ-
ined in O(k3) time and, if it is nonzero, p can be determined as gcd(detC, pq).
Lemma 4. Pr(detC = 0 mod pq) ≤ (2k − 1)(1/p+ 1/q).
Once we have recovered p, we can use the known mi to determine the de-
cryption vector γ, by solving linear equations. Let C0 = [c1 c2 . . . ck], m
T =
[m1 m2 . . . mk].
Lemma 5. Pr(detC0 = 0 mod pq) ≤ (2k − 1)(1/p+ 1/q).
Thus, with high probability, we can uniquely solve the system γTC0 =m
T
mod p, to recover γ and enable decryption of an arbitrary ciphertext. However,
encryption of messages is not possible, since we gain little information about
a1, . . . ,ak. Note also that, if we determined p by some means other than using
k known plaintexts, it is not clear how to recover γ.
To break this system, we need to guess k plaintexts. The entropy of a k-tuple
of plaintexts (m1,m2, . . . ,mk) is kρ, so effectively we need µ
k guesses, where
µ is the number of guesses needed to break HE1. So HEk can tolerate much
smaller entropy than HE1, provided k is large enough. If k is sufficiently large,
the scheme appears secure without adding noise, but does not have the other
advantages of adding noise.
Fixing an Insecurity for k > 2 The decryption vector for HEk is γT =
(A−1k )1. Note that γ
T
1 = 1 and γTai = 0 (i ∈ [1, k − 1]), since γTai = I1i
(i ∈ [0, k − 1]).
The equations R(a⋆i ◦ a⋆j) = p̺ij 1+
∑k−1
l=1 σijlal,
(4)
define a product · on Zkpq so that c · c′ = R(c⋆ ◦ c′⋆). This product is linear,
commutative and distributive, since R and ⋆ are linear operators, and ◦ is com-
mutative and distributive. So we have an algebra Ak, with unit element 1 [51].
The ̺ij , σijl (i, j, l ∈ [1, k − 1]) are the structure constants of the algebra. In
general,Ak will not be associative, i.e. we can have (c1 · c2) · c3 6= c1 · (c2 · c3)
This leads to a potential insecurity. We must have
γT ((c1 · c2) · c3) = γT (c1 · (c2 · c3)) (mod p), (5)
in order to have correct decryption. The associator for Ak is
[ci, cj , cl] = ci · (cj · cl)− (ci · cj) · cl = rp1+
∑k−1
l=1 slcl (mod pq).
Thus [ci, cj , cl] is an encryption of 0. If we can find k associators from c1, . . . , cn
which violate (5), with high probability we have k linearly independent associ-
ators. We can use these to make a collision attack on HEk, similar to that de-
scribed in section 3.1. We use the gcd method to determine p, and then γ, as
described in section A.1. In fact all we need is that (5) holds for any associator.
That is, for all c1, c2, c3, we need
γT ((c1 · c2) · c3) = γT (c1(·c2 · c3)) (mod pq),
or, equivalently, using the Chinese Remainder Theorem,
γT ((c1 · c2) · c3) = γT (c1 · (c2 · c3)) (mod q). (6)
By linearity, (6) holds if and only if it holds for all basis elements, excluding the
identity. That is, for all i, j, l ∈ [1, k − 1], we need
γT (ai · (aj · al)) = γT ((ai · aj) · al) (mod q). (7)
The associator for Ak is
[ai,aj ,al] = ai · (aj · al)− (ai · aj) · al = rp1+
∑k−1
l=1 slal (mod pq),
for some integers r, s1, . . . , sk−1, and so γ
T [ai,aj ,al] = rp.
If Ak is associative, the problem does not arise, since (7) will be satisfied
automatically. Associativity holds if k ≤ 2. All we have to check is that a · (a ·
a) = (a · a) · a, which is true by commutativity. Thus HE1, HE2 cannot be
attacked in this way.
Requiring associativity in Ak overconstrains the system, imposing k
(
k+1
2
)
equations on the k
(
k+1
2
)
structure constants. With only k(k − 1) undetermined
parameters, this is too much. But all we need is that (7) holds. We have
Lemma 6. Equation (7) holds if and only if
∑k−1
t=1 σjlt̺it =
∑k−1
t=1 σijt̺lt
(mod q), ∀i, j, l ∈ [1, k − 1].
Now we can ensure (7) by giving the ̺ij a multiplicative structure.
Lemma 7. Let τ, ̺i
$←− [0, q) (i ∈ [1, k − 1]), let ̺ij = ̺i̺j mod q, and let
the σijl satisfy
∑k−1
l=1 σijl̺l = τ̺i̺j (mod q) for all i, j ∈ [1, k−1]. Then, for
all i, j, ℓ ∈ [1, k − 1], γT (ai · (aj · al)) = τ̺i̺j̺l mod q, the symmetry of
which implies (7).
Thus the conditions of Lemma 7 are sufficient to remove the insecurity. The
price is that we now have (k−1)(k
2
)
+(k−1)+k(k−1) = (k+1)(k
2
)
+k−1
parameters and k
(
k
2
)
equations. There are
(
k
2
)
+ (k − 1) = (k + 2)(k − 1)/2
independent parameters. This is fewer than the original k(k − 1), but remains
Ω(k2).
A.2 Insufficient Entropy (HEkN)
We generalise HE2N to k dimensions.
Key Generation. KeyGen, randomly chooses κ, p and q as outlined in sec-
tion 4.2, and sets aj ∀j and R as in A.1. The secret key, sk, is (κ, p, a1, . . .,
ak−1), and the public parameters are pq and R. Note that, as a result of adding
the “noise” term, defence against non-associativity is not required.
Encryption. A plaintext,m ∈ [0,M ], is enciphered as
Enc(m, sk) = c = (m+ rp+ sκ)1+
∑k−1
j=1 tjaj (mod pq)
where r, s are as in section 4.2, and tj
$←− [0, pq) ∀j ∈ [1, k).
Decryption. If γT is defined as in section A.1, a ciphertext is deciphered by,
Dec(c, sk) = (γT c mod p) mod κ.
Arithmetic. Addition and multiplication of ciphertexts are as in section A.1.
Security. The effective entropy of HEkN is ρ′ = k(ρ+lg κ). Thus, as we in-
crease k, the “noise” term can be made smaller while still providing the requisite
level of entropy.
Clearly HEkN also inherits the conclusions of Theorem 2, so this system
also satisfies IND-CPA.
B Proofs
Theorem 1. An attack against HE1 is successful in polynomial time if and only
if we can factorise a distinct semi-prime in polynomial time.
Proof. Suppose that we have an unknown plaintextm, encrypted as c = m+rp
mod pq, where r
$←− [1, q).
If we can factor pq in polynomial time, we can determine p and q in poly-
nomial time, since we know p < q. Therefore, we can determinem = c mod p.
If we can determinem given c for arbitrarym, then we can determine rp =
c − m. We are given qp, and we know 0 < r < q, so gcd(rp, qp) must be p,
and we can compute p in polynomial time. Now, given p, we can determine q as
qp/p. Hence, we can factorise pq in polynomial time. ⊓⊔
Lemma 1. If the inputsm have entropy ρ then, for any two independent inputs
m1,m2, Pr(m1 = m2) ≤ 2−ρ.
Proof. Pr(m1 = m2) =
∑M−1
i=0 ξ
2
i = 2
−H2 ≤ 2−ρ, since H2 ≥ H∞ = ρ. ⊓⊔
Theorem 2. For any encryption c, c mod κ is polynomial time indistinguish-
able from the uniform distribution on [0, κ). Thus HE1N satisfies IND-CPA,
under the assumption that SPACDP is not polynomial time solvable.
Proof.
c = m+ sκ+ rp = m+ rp mod κ,
where r
$←− [1, q). Thus, for i ∈ [0, κ),
Pr
(
c mod κ = i) = Pr(m+ rp = i mod κ
)
= Pr
(
r = p−1(i−m) mod κ)
∈ {⌊q/κ⌋1/q, ⌈q/κ⌉1/q}
∈ [1/κ− 1/q, 1/κ+ 1/q],
where the inverse p−1 of p mod κ exists since p is a prime. Hence the total
variation distance from the uniform distribution is
1
2
κ−1∑
i=0
|Pr (c mod κ = i)− 1/κ| < κ/q.
This is exponentially small in the security parameter λ of the system, so the
distribution of c mod κ cannot be distinguished in polynomial time from the
uniform distribution. Note further that c1 mod κ, c2 mod κ are independent for
any two ciphertexts ci = mi+siκ+rip (i = 1, 2), since r1, r2 are independent.
To show IND-CPA, suppose now that known plaintexts µ1, . . . , µn are en-
crypted by an oracle for HE1N, giving ciphertexts c1, . . . , cn. Then, for ri
$←−
[0, q), si
$←− [0, κ), we have an SPACDP with ciphertexts ci = mi + siκ+ rip,
and the approximate divisor p cannot be determined in polynomial time in the
worst case. However, the offsets in this SPACDP are all of the form µi + siκ,
for known mi, and we must make sure this does not provide information about
p. To show this, we rewrite the SPACDP as
ci = µi + siκ+ rip = µ
′
i + s
′
iκ, (i = 1, 2, . . . , n), (8)
where s′i = si + ⌊(mi + rip)/κ⌋, and µ′i = µi + rip (mod κ). Now we may
view (8) as an ACDP, with “encryptions” µ′i of the µi, and approximate divisor
κ. Since ACDP is at least as hard as SPACDP, and the offsets µ′i are polynomial
time indistinguishable from uniform [0, κ), from above, we will not be able to
determine κ in polynomial time. Now, the offsetsm′1,m
′
2 of any two plaintexts
m1,m2 are polynomial time indistinguishable from m
′
2,m
′
1, since they are in-
distinguishable from two independent samples from uniform [0, κ). Therefore,
in polynomial time, we will not be able to distinguish between the encryption
c1 ofm1 and the encryption c2 ofm2. ⊓⊔
Theorem 3. The encryption scheme produces ciphertexts with components which
are random integers modulo pq.
Proof. Consider a ciphertext vector which encrypts the plaintext, m, and the
expression m + rp + sa mod pq which represents one of its elements. Then
r
$←− [0, q), s $←− [0, pq).
Consider first m + sa. We know that a−1 mod pq exists because a 6= 0
(mod p and mod q). Thus, conditional on r,
Pr[m+ rp+ sa = i mod pq] =
Pr[s = a−1(i−m− rp) mod pq] = 1
pq
.
Since this holds for any i ∈ [0, pq),m+ra+sp mod pq is a uniformly random
integer from [0, pq). ⊓⊔
Theorem 4. If c is an encryption ofm and c′ is an encryption ofm′ thenR(c⋆◦
c′
⋆
) (mod pq) is an encryption ofmm′.
Proof. Consider the Hadamard product modulo pq, c⋆ ◦ c′⋆, of the two augmen-
ted ciphertext vectors c⋆ and c⋆
′:
z⋆ = c⋆ ◦ c′⋆ =

c1c
′
1
c2c
′
2
c3c
′
3

 mod pq
Therefore, if inputsm,m′ are encrypted as (m+ rp)1+ sa, (m′+ r′p)1+
s′a, we first calculate
z⋆ = (m+ rp)(m
′ + r′p)1⋆ + [(m+ rp)s
′ + (m′ + r′p)s]a⋆
+ ss′a◦2⋆ = (mm
′ + r1p)1⋆ + s1a⋆ + ss
′a◦2⋆ mod pq,
where r1 = mr
′ + m′r + rr′p, s1 = (m + rp)s
′ + (m′ + r′p)s, and a◦2⋆ =
[a21 a
2
2 a
2
3]
T .
As we can see, z⋆ is not a valid encryption of mm
′. We need to re-encrypt
this product to eliminate the a◦2⋆ term.
We achieve this by multiplying z⋆ by R. It is easy to check that R1⋆ = 1
and Ra⋆ = a, independently of a1, a2. Now
(Ra◦2⋆ )1 = (1− 2α1)a21 + α1a22 + α1(2a1 − a2)2
= a21 + α1((2a1 − a2)2 + a22 − 2a21)
= a21 + 2α1(a2 − a1)2
= a21 + α1β
= ̺p+ σa1
(Ra◦2⋆ )2 = −2α2a21 + (α2 + 1)a22 + α2(2a1 − a2)2
= a22 + α2((2a1 − a2)2 + a22 − 2a21)
= a22 + 2α2(a2 − a1)2
= a22 + α2β
= ̺p+ σa2
Thus, we obtain the identity Ra◦2⋆ = ̺p1+ σa.
So, applying R to z⋆, i.e. z
′ = Rz⋆, gives
z′ = (mm′ + r1p)R1+ s1Ra+ ss
′Ra◦2
= (mm′ + r1p)1+ s1a+ ss
′(σa+ ̺p1)
= (mm′ + r2p)1+ (s1 + σrr
′)a
= (mm′ + r2p)1+ s2a (mod pq)
for some integers r2, s2. So z
′ is a valid encryption ofmm′. ⊓⊔
Theorem 5. SPACDP is of equivalent complexity to the special case of HE2
where δ = a2 − a1 (0 < δ < q) is known.
Proof. Suppose we have a system of n approximate prime multiples, mi + rip
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n). Then we generate values a, s1, s2, . . . , sn
$←− [0, pq), and we
have an oracle set up the cryptosystem with a1 = a, a2 = a+ δ. The oracle has
access to p and provides us with R, but no information about its choice of ̺ and
σ. We then generate the ciphertexts ci (i = 1, 2, . . . , n):[
ci1
ci2
]
=
[
mi + rip+ sia
mi + rip+ si(a+ δ)
]
(mod pq). (9)
Thus ci1 − sia = ci2 − si(a + δ) = mi + rip. Thus finding the mi in (9) in
polynomial time solves SPACDP in polynomial time.
Conversely, suppose we have any HE2 system with a2 = a1 + δ. The
ciphertext for mi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) is as in (9). so si = δ
−1(ci2 − ci1). Since
0 < δ < q < p, δ is coprime to both p and q, and hence δ−1 mod pq ex-
ists. Thus breaking the system is equivalent to determining themi mod p from
mi+δ
−1(ci2−ci1)a+rip (i = 1, 2, . . . , n). Determining themi+δ−1(ci2−ci1)a
from themi+δ
−1(ci2−ci1)a+rip (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) can be done using SPACDP.
However, we still need to determine a in order to determinemi. This can be done
by “deciphering” R using SPACDP. We have
2δ2α1 = σa− a2 + ̺p, 2δ2α2 = σ(a+ δ)− (a+ δ)2 + ̺p,
so σ = 2δ2(α2−α1)−2ka−δ2. Now a can be determined by first determining
m0 = a(2δ
2(α2 − α1) − (2δ + 1)a − δ2) from m0 + ̺p = 2δ2α1. This can
be done using SPACDP. Then a can be determined by solving the quadratic
equation m0 = a(2δ
2(α2 − α1) − (2δ + 1)a − δ2) mod p for a. This can be
done probabilistically in polynomial time using, for example, the algorithm of
Berlekamp [7]. So the case a = [a a+δ]T , with known δ, can be attacked using
SPACDP on the system
m0 + ̺p, m1 + δ
−1(c11 − c12)a+ r1p,
. . . , mn + δ
−1(cn1 − cn2)a+ rnp. ⊓⊔
Lemma 2. Pr(a0,a1, . . . ,ak−1 do not form a basis) ≤ (k − 1)(1/p+ 1/q).
Proof. The a’s are a basis if A−1k exists, since then v = Akr when r = A
−1
k v,
for any v. Now A−1k exists mod pq if (detAk)
−1 mod pq exists, by con-
structing the adjugate of Ak. Now (detAk)
−1 mod pq exists if detAk 6= 0
mod p and detAk 6= 0 mod q. Now detAk is a polynomial of total de-
gree (k − 1) in the aij (0 < i ≤ k, 0 < j < k), and is not identically
zero, since detAk = 1 if ai = ei+1 (1 < i < k). Also aij
$←− [0, pq) im-
plies aij mod p
$←− [0, p) and aij mod q $←− [0, q). Hence, using the Schwartz-
Zippel Lemma (SZL) [44], we have Pr(detAk = 0 mod p) ≤ (k − 1)/p and
Pr(detAk = 0 mod q) ≤ (k − 1)/q, and it follows that Pr(∄ (detAk)−1 mod
pq) ≤ (k − 1)(1/p+ 1/q). ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. Let A⋆k = [a⋆0 a⋆1 . . . a⋆,k−1], where the columns of Ak form a
basis for Zkpq. If RA⋆k = Ak, then Rv⋆ = v for all v ∈ Zkpq.
Proof. We have v = Akr for some r ∈ Zkpq. Then A⋆k = UkAk and v⋆k =
Ukv, so Rv⋆ = RUkv = RUkAkr = RA⋆kr = Akr = v. ⊓⊔
Theorem 6. A◦2⋆k has no inverse mod pq with probability at most (k
2−1)(1/p+
1/q).
Proof. We use the same approach as in Lemma 2. ThusA◦2⋆k is invertible provided
detA◦2⋆k 6= 0 mod p and detA◦2⋆k 6= 0 mod q. Let A denote the vector of
aij’s, (aij : 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j < k). The elements of A◦2⋆k are quadratic poly-
nomials over A, except for the first column, which has all 1’s, and columns
2, 3, . . . , k which are linear polynomials. So detA◦2⋆k is a polynomial overA of
total degree 2
(
k
2
)
+ k − 1 = k2 − 1. Thus, unless detA◦2⋆k is identically zero
as a polynomial over A, the SZL [44] implies Pr(∄ (detA◦2⋆k)
−1 mod p) ≤
(k2 − 1)/p and Pr(∄ (detA◦2⋆k)−1 mod q) ≤ (k2 − 1)/q. Therefore we have
Pr(∄ (detA◦2⋆k)
−1 mod pq) ≤ (k2 − 1)(1/p+ 1/q).
It remains to prove that detA◦2⋆k is not identically zero as a polynomial over
A in either Zp or Zq. We prove this by induction on k. Consider Zp, the argu-
ment for Zq being identical. Since Zp is a field, detA◦2⋆k is identically zero if and
only if it has rank less than
(
k+1
2
)
for all A. That is, there exist λij(A) ∈ Zp
(0 ≤ i ≤ j < k), not all zero, so that
L(A) =
k−1∑
0≤i≤j
λija⋆i ◦ a⋆j
= α+ a⋆,k−1 ◦ β + λk−1,k−1a◦2⋆,k−1 = 0,
where α =
∑k−2
0≤i≤j λija⋆i ◦ a⋆j and β =
∑k−2
i=0 λi,k−1a⋆i are independent of
a⋆,k−1.
Clearly λk−1,k−1 = 0. Otherwise, whatever α,β, we can choose values for
ak so that L 6= 0, a contradiction. Now suppose λi,k−1 6= 0 for some 0 ≤ i <
k − 1. The matrix Aˆ⋆ with columns a⋆i (0 ≤ i < k − 1) contains Ak−1 as
a submatrix, which has rank (k − 1) with high probability by Lemma 2. Thus
β 6= 0 and, whatever α, we can choose values for ak so that L 6= 0. Thus
λi,k−1 = 0 for all 0 ≤ i < k. Thus λij 6= 0 for some 0 ≤ i ≤ j < k − 1.
Now the matrix Aˆ◦2⋆ with
(
k
2
)
columns a⋆i ◦ a⋆j (0 ≤ i ≤ j < k − 1) contains
A◦2⋆,k−1 as a submatrix, and therefore has rank
(
k
2
)
by induction. Hence α 6= 0,
implying L 6= 0, a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4. Pr(detC = 0 mod pq) ≤ (2k − 1)(1/p+ 1/q).
Proof. From Lemma 2, detA = 0 mod p or detA = 0 mod q with prob-
ability at most (k − 1)(1/p + 1/q). So detA is not zero or a divisor of zero
modpq. The entries of W ′ are random [0, pq), and detW ′ is a polynomial
of total degree k in its entries. It is a nonzero polynomial, since W ′ = Ik
is possible. Hence, using the SZL [44], Pr(detW ′ = 0 mod p) ≤ k/p and
Pr(detW ′ = 0 mod q) ≤ k/q. So detW ′ is zero or a divisor of zero mod pq
with probability at most k(1/p + 1/q). So detA detW ′ = 0 modpq with
probability at most (2k − 1)(1/p + 1/q). So detC 6= 0 with high probabil-
ity. ⊓⊔
Lemma 5. Pr(detC0 = 0 mod pq) ≤ (2k − 1)(1/p+ 1/q).
Proof. Note that C0 = C ifm1 = m2 = · · · = mk = 0. Since Lemma 4 holds
in that case, the result follows. ⊓⊔
Lemma 6. Equation (7) holds if and only if
∑k−1
t=1 σjlt̺it =
∑k−1
t=1 σijt̺lt
(mod q), ∀i, j, l ∈ [1, k − 1].
Proof. Since γT1 = 1 and γTai = 0, i ∈ [1, k−1], γT (ai ·aj) = γT
(
p̺ij 1+∑k−1
l=1 σijlal
)
= p̺ij . Thus
ai · (aj · al) = ai ·
(
p̺jl1+
k−1∑
t=1
σjltat
)
= p̺jlai +
k−1∑
t=1
σjltai · at,
and hence γT [ai · (aj · al)] = p
∑k−1
t=1 σjlt̺it. Similarly γ
T [(ai · aj) · al] =
p
∑k−1
t=1 σijt̺lt, and the lemma follows. ⊓⊔
Lemma 7. Let τ, ̺i
$←− [0, q) (i ∈ [1, k − 1]), let ̺ij = ̺i̺j mod q, and let
the σijl satisfy
∑k−1
l=1 σijl̺l = τ̺i̺j (mod q) for all i, j ∈ [1, k−1]. Then, for
all i, j, ℓ ∈ [1, k − 1], γT (ai · (aj · al)) = τ̺i̺j̺l mod q, the symmetry of
which implies (7).
Proof. We have γT (aj · al) = p̺ij = p̺j̺l for all j, ℓ ∈ [1, k − 1]. Hence,
mod q,
γT (ai · (aj · al)) = p
k−1∑
t=1
σjlt̺it
= p
k−1∑
t=1
σjlt̺i̺t
= p̺i
k−1∑
t=1
σjlt̺t
= p̺iτ̺j̺l = pτ̺i̺j̺l. ⊓⊔
C Derivation of Bounds
To recap, n is the number of inputs, M is an exclusive upper bound on the
inputs, d is the degree of the polynomial we wish to calculate. We take p ≈ 2λ
and then q ≈ 2η, where η = λ2/ρ− λ, to guard against the attacks of [17, 36].
For HE1, we assumeM ≈ 2ρ, n ≤ √M . Therefore,
p > (n+ 1)dMd ≈ (nM)d for large n.
So, we may take
p = 2λ > M3d/2 ≈ 23dρ/2 i.e. λ ≈ 3dρ/2
and η ≈ λ
2
ρ
− λ = 3dλ
2
− λ = 3dρ
2
(
3d
2
− 1
)
For HE1N, we assumeM ≈ 2ρ, and we have ρ′ = ρ+ lg κ. Now,
κ > (n+ 1)dMd ≈ (nM)d for large n, i.e. lg κ ≈ d(lg n+ ρ)
Therefore, since ρ = ρ′ − lg κ,
lg κ > d lg n+ d(ρ′ − lg κ) i.e. lg κ ≈ d(lg n+ ρ
′)
d+ 1
Since κ is much larger thanM , we also have
p = 2λ > (n+ 1)d(M + κ2)d ≈ (nκ2)d for large n i.e. λ ≈ d(lg n+ 2 lg κ),
and η ≈ λ
2
ρ′
− λ = 3dλ
2
− λ = 3dρ
′
2
(
3d
2
− 1
)
Then we can calculate η as for HE1 above. Note that, in both HE1 and HE1N,
λ scales linearly with d, and η scales quadratically. These bounds carry over to
HE2, HE2N, HEk and HEkN.
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